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Four Legs to Stand On: The Unexplored Potential of 
Civil War Era ‘Qui Tam’ Suits to Advance Animal 
Rights in the Federal Judiciary 
Michael W. Meredith† 
Animal rights advocates seeking to vindicate the interests of ani-
mals in federal court find themselves stuck between a rock and a 
hard place. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution only 
permits individuals to sue for an injury they themselves have suf-
fered, not an injury suffered by another or a non-human animal. 
Moreover, most federal law prohibits animals from suing on their 
own behalf. As a result, a number of landmark environmental cases 
have been dismissed from federal court due to a lack of standing, 
and those cases that have been allowed to proceed do so only by 
adopting the anthropocentric principle that animal suffering can be 
recognized if, and only if, it is directly tied to human suffering. This 
article explores a peculiarity in the civil war era ‘False Claims Act’ 
(31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.) legislation whose qui tam enforcement 
provisions permit a litigant to avoid the question of standing alto-
gether and, therefore, if applied in the areas of environmental and 
animal rights law, might permit a number of otherwise impermissi-
ble suits advancing the interests of animal rights to proceed in fed-
eral court while at the same time developing the basis for an anti-
anthropocentric jurisprudence in the federal judiciary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 When People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed its 
famous, ill-fated 2012 lawsuit alleging that Sea World amusement parks 
had violated the constitutional rights of the animals in their care, they 
encountered a legal hurdle that has plagued many animal rights activists 
seeking redress for harm done to non-human animals through the federal 
court system: human plaintiffs, generally, lack Article III standing to sue 
on behalf of non-human animals.1 
 If one is able to discard the notion that there is a fundamental 
difference between human and non-human animals, the basis for PETA’s 
suit was surprisingly straightforward. PETA’s complaint alleged simply 
                                                 
1. Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & 
Entm't, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1261-62 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (“Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to 
bring this action”).  
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that whales performing in Sea World’s shows “were forcibly taken from 
their families . . . held captive . . . and forced to perform . . . for [the] 
Defendants’ profit.”2 As such, PETA alleged that Sea World was acting 
in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and 
involuntary servitude. 3 
 District Judge Jeffery T. Miller granted Sea World’s motion to 
dismiss PETA’s claim, noting that the true plaintiff in PETA’s suit was 
not PETA, either as an organization or on behalf of its individual 
members. Rather, the court explained that the plaintiffs-in-fact were the 
whales themselves, “members of the orcinus orca or ‘killer whale’ 
species, the largest species in the dolphin family.”i The Court dismissed 
the case because “[t]he Constitution limits the federal judicial power to 
‘cases’ and ‘controversies’” and “[because] orcas . . . are without 
standing to bring this action, no ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ exists . . . .”4The 
Court found textual support for its decision in Article III, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution which requires, as a prerequisite to invoking 
the jurisdiction of federal courts, that a plaintiff establish standing. Put 
most simply, a plaintiff has standing when he can show that he 
personally has suffered an injury-in-fact.5 Thus, if a human plaintiff can 
only establish injury to a non-human animal, he generally will not meet 
this requirement, even for the most egregious violations of federal law.  
 Cass Sunstein, a noted constitutional scholar, has explained the 
manner in which the constitutional standing requirement has functioned 
in concert with less than zealous enforcement of federal animal rights 
law to erode many protections extended by statute to non-human animals 
and the environment:  
In the last three decades, the protection of animals has become a 
pervasive goal of federal statutory law. However controversial the 
idea of “animal rights” in theory, federal law has begun to recognize 
a wide range of animal rights in practice. Indeed, Congress has en-
                                                 
2. Joanna Zelman, PETA’s SeaWorld Slavery Case Dismissed By Judge, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 9, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/peta-seaworld-slavery-
_n_1265014.html. 
3. Id. 
4. Tilikum ex rel. 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1261-62. 
5. Id. (citing Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Svs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000))) (“To 
satisfy Article III, a plaintiff must show that (1) it has suffered an injury-in-fact that is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision”). 
190 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 4:1 
 
acted more than fifty statutes designed to protect the well-being of 
animals. 
Of these, the most prominent is the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 
which contains a wide range of safeguards against cruelty and mis-
treatment, and which creates an incipient bill of rights for animals. 
If vigorously enforced, the AWA, alongside other enactments at the 
state and federal levels, would prevent a wide range of abusive 
practices [suffered by non-human animals]. As so often, however, 
there is a large gap between statutory text and real-world implemen-
tation. Many people have criticized the national government's en-
forcement efforts under these statutes, contending that the executive 
branch has violated the law by issuing weak and inadequate regula-
tions, making the relevant statutes symbolic rather than real. 6 
 Sunstein’s ‘gap’ theory is exemplified by Judge Miller’s order 
dismissing PETA’s complaint, which demonstrates the divide between 
formal legislative statements asserting a protection and the ability to 
effectively and pragmatically enforce that protection. Indeed, the Court 
explicitly indicated in its order that “animals have many legal rights 
protected under both federal and state laws which provide for . . . 
humane treatment and criminalizing cruelty to animals.” 7 However, the 
court also noted that “only human beings have standing . . . [and] it is 
obvious that an animal cannot function as a juridically competent human 
being.”8  
 In PETA’s suit against Sea World, the plaintiff’s inability to meet 
Article III’s standing requirement proved to be fatal and resulted in the 
dismissal of the suit for want of federal jurisdiction.9 However, Article 
III’s requirement has not been universally applied. The classic exception 
to standing requirements are a type of legal action known as qui tam 
suits. A qui tam action is a lawsuit brought by a private citizen against a 
person or company allegedly violating a government regulation.10 Qui 
tam suits are exceptional because they are brought on behalf of the “the 
government as well as the plaintiff.”11 This permits qui tam plaintiffs to 
adopt, simultaneously, the legal attributes of both a private citizen and 
                                                 
6. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1333 (2000). 
7. Tilikum ex rel., 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1262 n.1. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. (“An action brought by a plaintiff who lacks standing is not a ‘case or controversy’ under 
Article III, resulting in the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the action”).  
10. Qui Tam Action, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
qui+tam+action (last visited June 4, 2014). 
11. Id. 
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the the federal government. Most importantly, for the purposes of the 
present analysis, qui tam suits permit private plaintiffs who have suffered 
no injury themselves to establish standing, within the meaning of Article 
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, based solely upon the 
harm suffered by a governmental entity due to violations of its laws or 
regulations.  
 The following analysis will consider the ways in which qui tam 
suits, especially those authorized by the civil-war era False Claims Act 
(FCA), are a means of strategically accomplishing two related goals: 
first, advancing the cause of animal rights in the federal judiciary; and 
second, reformulating the argument for the protection of animal rights as 
an independent state interest. In reaching that conclusion, this inquiry 
will: (I) clearly develop the ‘problem of standing’ faced by those seeking 
redress in federal court for harm suffered by animals; (II) analyze the 
history, purpose and function of the FCA; (III) propose methods by 
which the FCA’s qui tam enforcement provisions might be employed to 
address the problem of animal standing; (IV) propose federal laws that 
might benefit from enforcement by individual FCA qui tam suits; and 
(V) suggest ways in which qui tam suits brought, pursuant to the FCA, 
can function to develop a body of law that could re-frame the debate over 
animal rights in the federal judicial system, and provide an ideological 
challenge to the anthropocentric, or human-centered, jurisprudence that 
has developed surrounding the law of standing, which this piece will 
term an anti-anthropocentric jurisprudence. 
 It is the thesis of this piece that the development and enforcement of 
animal rights law and environmental protection legislation can 
meaningfully benefit, both practically and ideologically, from an 
application of the FCA’s private enforcement provisions. 
II. DEVELOPING THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL STANDING IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 
 Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution restricts the power 
of federal courts to ‘cases or controversies,’ thereby imposing what the 
Supreme Court has described as the “irreducible constitutional minimum 
of standing” necessary to proceed in federal court.12 To establish 
standing, or a justiciable case or controversy, within the meaning of 
                                                 
12. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 631-32 (2d Cir. 2003)(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
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Article III, a plaintiff must prove that he or she has sustained an injury-
in-fact caused by the actions of the defendant.13 
 It is this constitutional injury-in-fact requirement that has posed a 
serious impediment to animal rights advocates seeking a judicial remedy 
for animals or their habitats that have been unlawfully harmed. As the 
name implies, to establish an injury-in-fact a plaintiff must allege, in 
part, an “invasion of [a] . . . legally protected interest.”14 Given this 
requirement, the challenge facing an attorney seeking to proceed on 
behalf of an animal who has suffered harm is manifest; the actual human 
plaintiff has not suffered an invasion of any legally protected interest  
him or herself and, therefore, is unable to establish their constitutional 
authority, within the meaning of Article III § 2, to bring suit.  
 What’s more, the majority of federal laws protecting animals and 
their habitats—for example, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the 
Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA), and the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—explicitly provide that “individual 
animals do have standing to sue” to vindicate the protections included in 
these laws. 15 Therefore, with respect to standing, non-human animals are 
stuck between ‘a rock and a hard place.’ Individual animals who have 
experienced injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing—
including abuse, inhumane testing procedures, over-hunting, death, 
destruction of habitat, and extinction—are unable to proceed in court on 
their own behalf, but their human advocates who are authorized to 
proceed in court, have not, themselves, been harmed in a manner 
cognizable by Article III § 2.  
 To date, this ‘problem of standing’ has been addressed by seeking 
to link harm suffered by an animal to harm suffered by a human. For 
example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the United States Supreme 
Court held that “the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for 
purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for [the] 
purpose[s] of [establishing] standing.”16 Thus, according to the Court, the 
                                                 
13. Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). 
14. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
15. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004). 
16. Lujan, 504 U.S. at  562; see also Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 
505 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Japan Whaling 
Association and Defenders of Wildlife clearly recognize people’s affirmative aesthetic interest in 
viewing animals enjoying their natural habitat”); Humane Society v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 99 n.7 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Animal Welfare Institute v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that humans have a cognizable interest in “view[ing] animals free from . . . ‘inhumane 
treatment.’”); Humane Society v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (1988) (finding standing based on a 
complaint “that the existence of hunting on wildlife refuges forces Society members to witness 
animal corpses and environmental degradation, in addition to depleting the supply of animals and 
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problem of standing can be remedied by concluding that the harm 
suffered by an animal can be said to infringe upon a human’s legally 
protected ‘esthetic interest’ in observing that animal not being harmed. 
Similarly, the court in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean 
Society held that the plaintiffs, seeking to enjoin illegal whaling 
practices, had undoubtedly alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact in that the 
whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected 
by continued whale harvesting.17  
 In order to find Article III standing based upon the reasoning of 
Defenders of Wildlife, courts have generally required Plaintiffs to 
establish an individualized and personal connection to the injured animal 
in question. As the Supreme Court later noted, “[i]t is clear that [only] 
the person who observes or works with a particular animal threatened . . 
. is facing [a] perceptible harm.”18 Thus, “[t]o have standing, a party 
must demonstrate an interest that is distinct from the interest held by the 
public at large.”19 Merely asserting a generalized appreciation for animal 
life has been consistently held to be insufficient to confer standing, as the 
Court went on to explain:  
It goes beyond the limit . . . and into pure speculation and fantasy, 
to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered spe-
cies, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single pro-
ject affecting some portion of that species with which he has no 
more specific connection. 20 
                                                                                                             
birds that refuge visitors seek to view . . . [t]hese are classic aesthetic interest, which have always 
enjoyed protection under standing analysis”); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (finding “that the Fund’s members had standing to sue because of the psychological 
injury they suffered from viewing the killing of the bison in Montana . . . Fund members had been 
emotionally harmed”).  
17. Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566; see also Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 982 F.2d 
1332, 1340–41 (9th Cir.1992) (finding standing where plaintiffs “declared that they have observed, 
enjoyed and studied sea otters in specific areas in Alaska. . . . [T]he [plaintiffs] are concerned with 
action harming sea otters in Alaska, where [they] live and in particular areas that they frequent, 
unlike the declarants in Defenders of Wildlife.” (emphasis added)).  
19. Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n Inc., (A.L.V.A.) v. Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 939 (9th 
Cir. 1985). 
20. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 567; see also id. at 582 & 584 n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment)(“In my opinion a person who has visited the critical habitat of an endangered species, has 
a professional interest in preserving the species and its habitat, and intends to revisit them in the 
future has standing to challenge agency action that threatens their destruction    . . . [R]espondents 
would not be injured by the challenged projects if they had not visited the sites or studies the 
threatened species or habitat.” (emphasis added)); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 
720, 726(D.C.Cir. 1994) (“Had the [plaintiffs] challenging the Secretary’s regulations alleged an 
interest in protecting the well-bring of specific laboratory animals . . . [plaintiffs] would have had 
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Indeed, as noted by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the 
inability to establish a direct relationship between an injured animal and 
the human bringing suit on that animal’s behalf has been the downfall of 
a number of landmark cases in the area of environmental protection:  
In the environmental context . . . plaintiffs must establish that they 
have actually used or plan to use the allegedly degraded environ-
mental area in question. It is this failure to show such direct use that 
has resulted in the denial of standing in several high-profile envi-
ronmental cases.21 
III. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT  
 Federal anti-fraud legislation, and its qui tam enforcement 
provisions, might be usefully applied in the realm of environmental 
protection to resolve the ‘problem of standing’ that has plagued so many 
animal rights activists in federal. Specifically, one unique aspect of the 
False Claims Act (FCA) is that it allows a plaintiff to proceed in court 
without establishing Article III standing. Should the FCA’s exception to 
Article III’s standing requirement be extended to animal rights 
protection, a generalized right to bring suit on behalf of the environment 
as well as a new and productive judicial orientation towards the 
protection of animal rights might be forged. 
 Commonly referred to as the “Lincoln Law”, the FCA is a piece of 
federal legislation that imposes civil liability on individuals or companies 
that seek to defraud the federal government. The Act provides in relevant 
part that:  
[A]ny person who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to be present-
ed, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval . . . [or] 
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record 
or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim . . . is liable to 
the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than 
$5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of 
                                                                                                             
standing to challenge those regulations for providing insufficient protection to the animals.” 
(emphasis added)); Alternatives Research & Dev. Found. v. Glickman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 
(D.D.C. 2000) (finding standing for a psychology student was injured by observing the inhumane 
treatment of the animals used for testing); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n Inc., (A.L.V.A.) v. 
Weinberger, 765 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1985)(“If ALVA showed that the Navy's program would 
affect its members' aesthetic or ecological surroundings, its position also might be different”). 
21. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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damages which the Government sustains as a result of the act of that 
person. 22  
 In short, the law imposes a $5,000-$10,000 fine upon any individual 
who seeks to defraud the federal government, and further, holds them 
civilly liable for treble damages suffered by the government as a result of 
the fraud.  
 What makes the Act unique is its qui tam enforcement provision. 
That provision can be found in § 3730, and provides that: “a person may 
bring a civil action for violation of section 3729 for the person and the 
United States Government . . . [and] such person shall . . . receive at least 
15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement of the claim . . . .” 23 This provision authorizes and provides 
Article III standing to any person bringing suit on behalf of the United 
States, even if they have suffered no injury themselves.24  
 The provision authorizing enforcement of the FCA by private 
citizens was first passed by Congress in March 2, 1863 in order to 
combat the fraud perpetrated by contractors doing business with the 
Union army during the civil war. Historical records of the time are 
replete with examples of “[w]ar profiteers . . . shipping boxes of sawdust 
instead of guns . . . swindling the . . . Army into purchasing the same 
cavalry horses several times [or] . . . unloading moth-eaten blankets.”25 
President Abraham Lincoln, recognizing that the nascent federal 
                                                 
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).  
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)(d) (2006).  
24. See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993) (Because the 
government clearly is capable of establishing injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, qui tam 
plaintiffs satisfy these Article III requirements as well. Several courts and commentators have 
embraced this assignment theory); see United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United 
Technologies Corporation, 985 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993); United States 
Dept. of Housing and Urban Develop. ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 775 F.Supp. 172, 180–81 
(E.D.Pa.1991); Truong v. Northrop Corporation, 728 F.Supp. 615, 618–620 (C.D.Cal.1989); 
Thomas R. Lee, Comment, The Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 543, 563–70 (1990)). Moreover, this theory comports with federal practice. Federal 
courts routinely find that fraud claims are assignable. See AmeriFirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F.Supp. 
1365, 1370–71 (S.D.Fla.1991) (10b–5 claims assignable); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main 
Hurdman, 655 F.Supp. 259, 266–68 (E.D.Cal.1987) (bank actions for fraud and malpractice 
assignable to FDIC); In re National Mortg. Equity Corp., 636 F.Supp. 1138, 1152–56 
(C.D.Cal.1986) (RICO treble damage claims assignable). In addition, federal courts consistently 
recognize that an assignee of a fraud claim can assert his claim despite being unable to satisfy 
traditional standing requirements. AmeriFirst Bank, 757 F.Supp. at 1370; Main Hurdman, 655 
F.Supp. at 267. See also National Ass'n of Realtors v. Nat. Real Est. Ass'n., 894 F.2d 937, 941 (7th 
Cir.1990). 
25. Phillips and Cohen LLP, The False Claims Act: The History of the Law, ALL-ABOUT-QUI-
TAM.ORG, available at http://www.all-about-qui-tam.org/fca_history.shtml (last visited June 4, 
2014). 
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government lacked the “insider knowledge needed to uncover [the] 
sophisticated schemes of fraud against the federal treasury,”26 advocated 
for the passage of the FCA’s qui tam provision seeking to ‘deputize’ any 
citizen (called ‘relators’ for the purposes of the Act) with the power to 
sue on behalf of the government.27 Successful relators were incentivized 
and rewarded with 50 percent of the damages paid by fraudsters.28  
 In a masterful display of policy-making, Lincoln had provided a 
zero cost solution to a high cost problem. With the passage of a single 
piece of legislation, the FCA, the burden of detecting and policing 
fraud—a task that the underfunded and fledgling federal government was 
ill-equipped to take on—was shifted from the government to private 
citizens who were in a better position to collect information regarding 
fraud in the private sector as they were often employed by, or competing 
with, companies and contractors that might choose to engage in 
fraudulent behavior. Moreover, it provided economic incentives, in the 
form of damages awarded by the court, for those private citizens to 
diligently detect the fraud. Finally, it provided an efficient method of 
enforcing the terms of the law. Any citizen who could prove or even 
suspected fraud against the government was authorized to file a qui tam 
complaint on behalf of the government in any federal court.   
 A qui tam complaint is, in nearly every respect, identical to a 
complaint brought solely on behalf of a private citizen or corporation. 
However, there are two noteworthy differences. First, along with the 
complaint, the plaintiff must disclose all evidence of fraud to the 
government. This permits the government, if it chooses, to pursue an 
independent investigation of the matter, to intervene in the suit, move to 
dismiss the suit, or attempt to settle the suit out of court.29 Second, the 
case caption is distinct from a suit brought solely on behalf of a private 
party—it will include the phrase “United States of America ex rel” 
immediately preceding the plaintiff’s name. Ex rel is an abbreviation of 
the Latin phrase ex relatione, meaning “upon being related.”30 This 
phrase is intended to indicate that the suit is brought for another, whose 
                                                 
26. History of the Federal False Claims Act, WARREN BENSON LAW GRP., 
http://www.warrenbensonlaw.com/history-of-law/ (last visited June 4, 2014). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. How Quit Tam Works, BAUMAN & RAZOR GRP., http://www.quitam.com/about-qui-
tam/how-qui-tam-works/ (last visited June 4, 2014). 
30. Ex Rel., Cornell Univ. Law School: Legal Info. Inst., http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/ex_rel. (last visited June 4, 2014) 
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interests are ‘related’ to the plaintiff’s.31 It is for this reason that plaintiffs 
who bring qui tam suits are referred to as relators. 
 In 1943, the power of relators to sue on behalf of the government 
was dialed back when Congress amended the law to prohibit suit if a 
“government employee had [already] received a tip about the fraud or . . . 
any information about the fraud was contained in [any] . . . government 
file.”32 As a result of these severe restrictions, the act fell “into almost 
complete disuse” until the mid-1980s when, again, military contractors 
engaged systemic fraud to take advantage of the Regan administration’s 
unprecedented increase in defense spending: 
The public was reading a steady stream of stories describing outra-
geous billing practices, such as the Navy paying $435 for an ordi-
nary claw hammer and $640 for a toilet seat. In 1985, the Depart-
ment of Defense reported that 45 of the largest 100 defense contrac-
tors -- including nine of the top 10 -- were under investigation for 
multiple fraud offenses.33 
 In response to this widespread public scrutiny, the federal 
government sought to ‘crack down’ on fraud perpetrated by federal 
defense contractors. However, government agencies entrusted with the 
anti-fraud effort “complained that their . . . investigat[ions] . . . were 
hamstrung by insufficient resources, a lack of adequate legal tools and 
the difficulty of getting individuals with knowledge of fraud to speak 
up.”34 As a result, on October 27, 1986, Congress once again found it 
necessary to enlist the support of qui tam relators and amended the FCA 
to permit individuals who had already provided government with 
information concerning fraud to bring a qui tam suit.35  
 Although technical amendments to the bill have been introduced,36 
to date, the qui tam provisions have remained largely unchanged. 
However, the manner in which relators have used the qui tam provisions 
has evolved. As the role of the federal government and the funding it 
provides has expanded, so too has the reach of the Act. In addition to 
preventing fraud perpetuated by government contractors, the Act’s qui 
tam provisions have been used by relators to facilitate the development 
                                                 
31. Id. 
32. Phillips and Cohen LLP, supra note 25. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. “In 2009, amendments to the False Claim Act were included as section 4 of the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recover Act [which] . . . clarified terms used in the original law that were not 
defined in the statute.” Id. 
198 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 4:1 
 
of subsidized housing for low income families37, police Medicare and 
Medicaid fraud38, restrict the misuse of food stamps39, enforce banking 
and lending regulations40, prevent employment discrimination41, regulate 
educational loan providers, enforce prison regulations42, prevent the 
misuse of tribal land and funds43, reimburse victims of investment 
fraud44, implement ethnical drug and pharmaceutical testing 
procedures45, regulate energy production46, encourage arms control 
efforts47, influence curriculums in publicly-funded schools48, and prevent 
bribery and public corruption.49  
 For the purposes of the present inquiry, it is important to note that 
each of the above-listed claims were successfully pursued by individuals 
that, but for the qui tam provisions included in the FCA, would have 
lacked the necessary Article III standing to bring suit in federal court.  
IV. HOW THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT CAN BE USED TO ADDRESS THE 
PROBLEM OF ANIMAL STANDING 
 If, as noted above, a foundational challenge facing animal rights 
advocates seeking to proceed in court is an inability to establish standing 
on behalf of animals that they lack a direct or personal relationship with, 
the attractiveness of pursuing a FCA suit on behalf of injured animals is 
self-evident. Using the qui tam enforcement provision of the Act would 
                                                 
37. See e.g., United States v. Polly, 255 F. Supp. 610 (W.D.N.C. 1966); United States v. 
Eghbal, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2007) aff'd, 548 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2008). 
38. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5 (D.D.C. 1994) supplemented, 909 F. 
Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1995) aff'd in part and remanded, 111 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D.P.R. 2000); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Brooklyn v. Thompson, 
378 F. Supp. 2d 75 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); U.S. ex rel. Feingold v. Palmetto Gov't Benefits Adm’rs, 477 
F. Supp. 2d 1187 (S.D. Fla. 2007) aff'd sub nom. Feingold v. Palmetto Gov't Benefits Adm'rs, 278 
Fed. Appx. 923 (11th Cir. 2008). 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 860 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. La. 1994). 
40. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Verrill & Dana, 962 F. Supp. 206 (D. Me. 1997); 
United States v. Veneziale, 268 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1959). 
41. See, e.g., Orell v. UMass Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D. Mass. 2002). 
42. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gilmore, 202 F. Supp. 2d 478 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Menominee Tribal Enterprises, 601 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (E.D. Wis. 
2009). 
44. See, e.g., Wagner Iron Works v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 956 (Ct. Cl. 1959). 
45. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 538 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. 
Mass. 2008). 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Sci. Applications Intern. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 
2009) aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
47. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hayes v. CMC Electronics, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 734 (D.N.J. 2003). 
48. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Haskins v. Omega Inst., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 555 decision clarified on 
reconsideration, 25 F. Supp. 2d 510 (D.N.J. 1998). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Cripps, 460 F. Supp. 969 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 
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permit a relator to side-step the problem of standing all together. The 
following section will consider what, if any, goals of animal rights 
advocates might be pursued within the confines of the FCA.  
 In order to pursue a qui tam action, the FCA requires only that a 
relator establish that a defendant “knowingly . . . presented, a false or 
fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”50 Based upon this language, 
two meaningful elements can be identified when assessing the viability 
of a qui tam suit brought on behalf of an injured animal: first, whether 
there has been a ‘claim for repayment or approval’; and second, whether 
any ‘false or fraudulent claims’ are made against the interests of animals 
that might be actionable under the FCA. 
A. What constitutes a ‘claim for repayment or approval’ within the 
meaning of the False Claims Act?  
 The courts have provided the following test to determine whether a 
false claim is made against the United States:  
This test as to whether a false claim is made against the United 
States is whether there is a demand for money or for some transfer 
of public property or disbursement of public funds. Where the Unit-
ed States actually makes a loan by reason of a false application, 
there may be a claim under the false claims statute . . . the courts 
have always rejected the argument that the United States must suf-
fer actual damages before penalties . . . may be collected. 51 
In other words, the FCA is potentially applicable any time that the 
federal government provides something of value. 
 Given this test, any individual, institution, or organization receiving 
federal monies is a potential FCA defendant. This is important because a 
number of programs that infringe upon the rights of animals receive 
direct federal funding. For example, a number of animal rights 
organizations list amongst their top priorities the abolition of vivisection 
or inhumane laboratory testing on animals. The majority of this type of 
testing (indeed, most scientific testing) is supported by federal grants 
issued by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).52 At least one federal 
                                                 
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006).  
51. United States v. Cherokee Implement Co., 216 F. Supp. 374, 375 (N.D. Iowa 1963). 
52. Vivisection / Animals in Research, LAST CHANCE FOR ANIMALS, http://www.lcanimal.org/ 
index.php/campaigns/class-b-dealers-and-pet-theft/vivisectionanimals-in-research (last visited 
June 4, 2014) (“How much money is spent on vivisection? Every year, the U.S vivisection industries 
spend over $18 billion on animal experiments. The U.S. National Institutes of Health is the world's 
greatest source that funds animal experimentation, with an annual budget of more than $13 
billion.”). 
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court has noted, as a result of the federal government’s financial support 
for this research, the NIH and institutions receiving government funding 
for testing on animals are squarely within the scope of the FCA’s 
regulations. Plainly, any institution that receives federal funds is subject 
to the FCA. Thus, the NIH, which is federally funded, and institutions 
that receive federal funds from the NIH, are potential defendants in an 
FCA suit.  
 Indeed, the only reported case which has sought to use the FCA as a 
means of advancing the interests of animals was borne of an effort to 
prevent federal funding for controversial cancer research. The research 
replicated brain tumors in dogs by injecting cancer cells into beagle pups 
in utero, and euthanizing dogs that did not develop tumors after their 
birth.53 Although the case was dismissed due to timeliness (it was 
brought after the statute of limitations had run), the court noted the 
plaintiffs would have had standing to challenge the research despite their 
lack of personal connection to the animals in question.  
 Similarly, zoos, common targets of animal rights protests, “rely on 
government funding for 47% of their operating budget, on average” and 
therefore, constitute a potential FCA defendant.54 One need not look far 
to find potential plaintiffs for such an action. The National Organization 
to Abolish Zoos, the No Voice Unheard Organization, Responsible 
Policies for Animals, Inc., the Showing Animals Respect and Kindness 
Organization, PETA, and countless other animal rights groups,55 “oppose 
. . . zoos because cages and cramped enclosures at zoos deprive animals 
of the opportunity to satisfy their most basic needs.”56  
 A number of other institutions that receive federal funding have 
come under fire from animal rights groups, including: factory farms 
(which are the recipients of federal subsidies)57; gas and oil companies 
                                                 
53. U.S. ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare W., 602 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2010)(Relators, as 
animal rights group and officer of group, filed qui tam action, under False Claims Act (FCA), 
against medical researcher and hospitals, alleging that researcher had engaged in fraud when 
applying for National Institutes of Health (NIH) grant).  
54. Kelli B. Grant, 10 Things Zoos Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH.COM (May 31, 2011, 
12:39 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-zoos-wont-tell-you-1306528026434. 
55. Ashley Navarra, Melissa Yuen, Aaron Tuttle, HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS FOCUSED 
ON ANIMALS (Mar. 31, 2009), available at https://www.aza.org/uploadedFiles/Conservation/ 
Partnerships/OrganizationsFocusedOnAnimals.3rd.pdf. 
56.  Animal Rights Uncompromised: Zoos, PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL TREATMENT OF 
ANIMALS, http://www.peta.org/about-peta/why-peta/zoos/ (last visited June 4, 2014). 
57. Nathan Runkle, Obama’s Proposed Subsidy Cuts Could Impact Factory Forms, MERCY 
FOR ANIMALS (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.mfablog.org/2011/09/obamas-proposed-subsidy-cuts-
could-impact-factory-farms.html (“the United States government has spent 16.9 billion in tax dollars 
to subsidize . . . factory-farmed animals”). 
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(which receive nearly $41 billion a year from the federal government)58; 
the fishing industry (which receives “$713 million per year of direct 
subsidies . . . half of which . . . contribute to overfishing”)59; hunters 
(which receive USDA grants)60; and the auto industry (a heavily 
subsidized sector)61. Because each of these organizations and industries 
directly receive federal funding, relators seeking to use the Act in support 
of animals’ rights should have no difficulty in identifying potential 
defendants subject to the provisions of the FCA. What may be more 
difficult, however, is crafting an actionable claim for fraud or falsity 
within the meaning of the Act, which is discussed in the following 
section.  
B. What Constitutes ‘Fraud or Falsity’ Within the Meaning of the False 
Claims Act?  
 There are two major avenues by which a qui tam relator might seek 
to establish a claim for fraud or falsity within the meaning of the FCA: 
(1) bringing a direct FCA claim based upon false statements found in 
publicly available records of potentially offending institutions; and (2) 
seeking to enforce animal rights legislation and environmental protection 
law through an ‘implied certification’ theory, which does not require an 
‘affirmative misrepresentation’ on the part of the offending individual or 
institution. It is important to note that although direct and implied FCA 
claims are not two separate causes of action, they are analytically distinct 
because they rely on two separate theories of liability. Moreover, because 
a direct FCA claim requires a plaintiff to prove that a false statement has 
been made to the federal government in order to receive a material 
benefit and an implied claim requires a plaintiff to prove only that a 
material benefit has been conferred upon a defendant by the federal 
government, a plaintiff must consider the evidence they have when 
determining which type of FCA claim to pursue.  
                                                 
58. Mark Clayton, Budget Hawks: Does US Need to Give Gas and Oil Companies $41 Billion 
a Year ?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 9 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/ 
0309/Budget-hawks-Does-US-need-to-give-gas-and-oil-companies-41-billion-a-year. 
59. Jo Knight, New Study Shows Eliminating Harmful Subsidies Could Improve Health of U.S. 
Fisheries, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 3, 2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/news_room_ 
detail.aspx?id=49752 
60. Ducks Unlimited, Ducks Unlimited Pleased With ‘Open Fields’ Funding, DELTA FARM 
PRESS (Jan 31. 2011), http://deltafarmpress.com/government/ducks-unlimited-pleased-open-fields-
funding.  
61. Bob Moon, Auto Industry Subsidies Are Piling Up, MARKETPLACE BUS. (June 11, 2009, 
3:23 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/auto-industry-subsidies-are-piling. 
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1. ‘Direct’ FCA claims: reviewing applications for federal funding 
for affirmative misrepresentations 
 Direct FCA claims are claims seeking to remedy an affirmative 
misrepresentation made to the federal government in an effort to receive 
federal funds. Consider, for example, a medical testing facility that 
applied for and was awarded an NIH grant to pursue testing of a medical 
device on non-human animal subjects who had been appropriately 
sedated and medicated to reduce unnecessary suffering. Should an FCA 
relator find that the lab failed to provide the appropriate sedation or 
medication to their test subjects, a direct FCA claim would be 
appropriate because the lab had misrepresented the manner in which the 
testing would occur.  
 The practical difficulty in bringing a direct FCA claim is that it 
places the burden on the relator to seek out and provide evidence of a 
false representation made in the process of applying for federal funding. 
As a result, direct FCA claims generally require substantive research and 
a detailed review of government documents prior to bringing suit. 
However, relators have found a number of legal mechanisms to 
effectively gain access to the necessary information. One important tool 
that has been used to gain access to these government documents is the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
 In the only reported case seeking to use the qui tam provisions of 
the FCA to prevent testing on animals in a laboratory setting, United 
States ex rel. Patricia Haight, et al. v. Catholic Healthcare West, et. al., 
the plaintiffs had the benefit of being granted access to the defendant’s 
application for funding from the National Institutes of Health. Upon 
review of the application, the plaintiffs found that the defendant had 
“failed to disclose data showing a high rate of failure in preliminary 
trials, made false statements about the about the extent of his success 
with the research . . . and misrepresented another researcher’s 
involvement with the project.” As a result, the plaintiffs were able to 
bring an FCA action.62  
 Although a unique situation, future relators can use the Patricia 
Haight case as a model. First, plaintiffs, seeking substantive support that 
a misrepresentation was made, should file a FOIA request seeking access 
to documents provided by potential FCA defendants. Animal rights 
organizations especially should consider such a strategy; courts have 
consistently recognized that these types of organizations have 
‘informational standing’ to seek access, through the FOIA, to 
                                                 
62. U.S. ex rel. Haight v. Catholic Healthcare W., 602 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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applications for federal funding that might provide the basis for a FCA 
suit.63 Second, upon receipt of the information requested, plaintiffs 
should compare any claims made by the defendant in their pursuit of 
federal funding to their actual practices. Using this model, FCA relators 
can act as watchdogs for any organizations seeking federal funds and 
enforce violations of animal rights by filing ‘direct’ FCA claims.  
 Of course, this model is not universally applicable nor is it 
foolproof; two potential difficulties facing relators seeking to apply the 
Haight model immediately present themselves. First, potential relators 
must successfully establish standing and be granted a FOIA request. If 
the request is denied, the potential relators will only have access to 
publicly available information. Second, a direct FCA claim can only be 
successful when the defendant has made an affirmative misrepresentation 
in their application for federal funding. If no affirmative 
misrepresentation has been made, potential FCA relators can only 
proceed with a theory of ‘implied certification.’  
2. Implied FCA Claims: Enforcing compliance with animal rights 
legislation through a theory of ‘implied certification’ 
 Implied FCA claims result when a defendant receives federal 
funding and engages in illegal behavior, yet no affirmative 
misrepresentation was made to the government in requesting the federal 
funding. In such a suit, the plaintiff’s claim rests upon the theory that by 
accepting federal funding, a defendant impliedly agrees to abide by all 
federal laws. The implied agreement replaces the affirmative 
misrepresentation required under the direct FCA suit for the purposes of 
establishing a defendant’s liability. Consider, once again, the above-
described NIH-funded laboratory that engages in animal testing without 
providing appropriate anesthetizing medication to their test subjects. 
Even if the lab made no misrepresentations concerning the anesthetizing 
medication, the failure to medicate may constitute cruelty in 
contravention of federal animal rights laws, and a FCA relator may 
pursue an implied FCA claim against the lab as a result.  
 Courts have recognized that when the federal government provides 
federal monies or a grant to a private organization, it seeks to have that 
funding used in furtherance of—not in contravention of—its statutorily 
defined goals. Thus, upon receipt of payment, such an organization is 
presumed by many courts to have impliedly consented to the terms and 
                                                 
63. Am. Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm't, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) 
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conditions of any relevant federal laws. Should such an organization 
violate those laws, therefore, they may be subject to an implied FCA 
action.  
 However, courts have also noted that the FCA should not be 
considered a blunt instrument for enforcing all violations of all federal 
law, meaning that, although the FCA has broad applicability, it should 
not be used as a means of avoiding the nuances and requirements 
included in federal laws and, instead, should only be used to when 
violations of the core principles of federal law are achieved through 
federal funding.64 In order to ensure that the Act is used as a precision 
tool, as opposed to a blunt instrument, courts have developed a 
materiality test for implied certification. The materiality test permits an 
implied FCA claim to be brought to enforce federal law if, and only if, 
“the regulatory violation is clearly central to the program 
involved.”65Although there is no clear definition of what constitutes 
centrality within the meaning of the materiality test, federal courts have 
provided a few examples of when implied certification claims are 
permitted: (1) enforcement of the Small Business Administration 
Minority-Owned Business Program (where a defendant entered into a co-
management agreement with a non-minority-owned business)66; (2) 
enforcement of Medicaid regulations which “require health care 
providers to meet quality of care standards” (where a defendant failed to 
provide a safe environment for children in psychiatric care)67; and (3) 
enforcement of Medicare regulations which required services to be 
provided economically (where a defendant ordered a test “solely to 
increase the Medicare payout,” which the court found was clearly 
contrary to the central purpose of the regulations).68Given the far-
reaching applicability of the implied certification theory, there is no 
principled reason that it could not be applied to enforce federal 
environmental protection or animal rights laws as well. The following 
section will outline the manner in which the FCA might function to 
                                                 
64. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Wright v. Comstock Resources, Inc., 2011 WL 6259893 (5th Cir. 
2011)  
65. Claire M. Sylvia, The False Claims Act: Fraud Against the Government § 4:33 (2d ed. 
2010). 
66. Ab-Tech Const., Inc. v. U.S., 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434, 39 Cont. Cas. Fed. (CCH) ¶76668 
(1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (The court viewed the defendant's requests for payment 
pursuant to the program as “implied certification by Ab-Tech of its continuing adherence to the 
requirements for participation in the [minority-owned business] program.”). 
67. U.S. ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers of Oklahoma, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 
1485, 52 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 371 (W.D. Okla. 1996). 
68. U.S. ex rel. Kneepkins v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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permit standing to enforce some of the most hailed pieces of 
environmental law.  
V. WHAT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OR ANIMAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 
MIGHT BE ENFORCED THROUGH THE FCA’S ‘QUI TAM’ PROVISIONS? 
 The federal courts have spoken clearly to plaintiffs seeking to 
enforce a piece of federal law through an application of the FCA’s qui 
tam provisions, explaining that a successful plaintiff cannot use the FCA 
as a blunt instrument. As such, plaintiffs must carefully consider what 
federal laws are truly amenable to enforcement via a qui tam claim. It is 
the aim of this section to provide some guidance as to what pieces of 
environmental or animal rights law might be appropriate for enforcement 
via the FCA’s qui tam provisions.  
 To briefly summarize the above analysis, it has been argued that, as 
an empirical and philosophical matter, a fundamental problem for animal 
rights activists seeking to protect the environment or the rights of 
animals through the federal judiciary is their inability to maintain Article 
III standing. Further, it has been suggested that, given the extent to which 
federal funding been used to subsidize individuals and industries which 
contribute to animal suffering and the degradation of the environment, 
the FCA—which seeks ensure that federal monies are not spent in 
violation of federal law and permits a litigant to avoid the question of 
standing—might allow the enforcement of environmental protection or 
animal rights legislation through individual relator-suits. Supposing the 
validity of these initial propositions, the remaining question is what 
pieces of federal law are most strategically suited to enforcement via an 
FCA claim. 
 Although nearly any piece of federal environmental legislation or 
animals rights law could, in theory, be enforced through an innovative 
application of the FCA, the following section will classify some of the 
most well-recognized federal environmental protections into four 
analytically distinct categories: (1) laws that include a citizen 
enforcement provision and affirmatively contemplated enforcement by 
individuals; (2) laws that lack a citizen enforcement provision, but 
require that affirmative representations be made to a federal agency by 
potential violators; (3) laws that rely on permitting procedures as a 
means of environmental management; and (4) laws that merely prohibit 
certain environmentally dangerous actions, but do not require that an 
affirmative pledge be made to the federal government to refrain from 
those actions.  
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 It is argued that the first three categories of federal law are 
amenable, in varying degrees, to enforcement via a direct FCA claim. 
However, the final category is amenable only to an FCA claim brought 
pursuant an implied certification theory. It is important to note that the 
particular pieces of legislation discussed are not intended to be an 
exhaustive list of laws that might be enforced via a FCA suit. Rather, 
they are meant only to be illustrative examples or ideal types of 
categories described above. In other words, these categories provide 
practitioners with categories that may serve as an analytical tool to 
classify any federal law and, thereby, consider what potential FCA 
claims might exist to enforce its provisions. 
A. Enforcing Laws that Include ‘Citizen Enforcement Provisions’: The 
Case of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)  
 No serious discussion of strategic, citizen-based enforcement of 
federal environmental law can avoid a consideration of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). Enacted in 1973, the ESA established a scheme 
whereby “endangered” or “threatened” animal species could be protected 
from “private and governmental actions that may jeopardize their 
survival and recovery.”69 
 Without considering the FCA, an individual seeking to bring a suit 
to protect a threatened or endangered animal population would likely 
turn to the ESA as a enforcement mechanism because it includes, at 
Section 11(g), a “citizen suit” provision that allows “any person” to 
commence a civil suit in federal district court on his or her own behalf to 
force compliance with the ESA's mandates. 70 
 On its face, Section 11(g) appears to provide the necessary authority 
for anyone to enforce the law against any entity threatening an 
endangered or threatened animal population and, therefore, obviates the 
need for an application of the FCA. However, as federal courts have 
consistently maintained:  
[t]he ESA does not provide Article III standing. Plaintiffs in ESA 
citizen-suit actions must satisfy the following requirements: an inju-
ry-in-fact, to a cognizable interest fairly traceable to the alleged vio-
lation, [and] likely to be redressed by the relief sought.71 
It is because of this constraint that successful suits brought pursuant to 
Section 11(g) have been few and far between.  
                                                 
69. Publisher’s Editorial Staff, 89 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 125 (3d. 2006). 
70. Id.  
71. Id. 
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 While there is no guarantee against similar restrictions imposed 
upon qui tam suits, the ability of FCA to permit plaintiffs to “side-step” 
the Article III standing requirement holds the potential to re-invigorate 
the ESA’s “citizen-enforcement” and accomplish what Section 11(g) 
could not—providing effective federal protection to ‘endangered’ or 
‘threatened’ species and their habitats. Further, because the ESA includes 
a number of mandatory reporting requirements, FCA relators seeking to 
enforce the Act through a ‘direct’ FCA claim will be afforded ample 
material with which to establish the ‘false claim of compliance’ 
necessary to bring suit directly under the Act.72  
B. Enforcing Laws that Require Affirmative Certifications or Representa-
tions to the Federal Government: the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)  
 The second analytically useful category of federal environmental 
law are pieces of legislation that do not explicitly include an ESA-style 
citizen enforcement provision, but do require affirmative representations 
be made to the federal government. An affirmative representation or 
certification is any statement made to the federal government that is a 
necessary pre-requisite to gaining federal funding. As long as the law 
requires that such a statement be made, it is a potential candidate for 
enforcement via a direct FCA suit. Consider, for example, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA, often considered the “first of 
the modern environmental statutes,” 73 requires that any individual, 
institution or corporation undertaking “major activities [on behalf of] . . . 
or funded by the federal government”74 submit an environmental impact 
assessment to the federal Council on Environmental Quality.75 Although 
NEPA was widely considered to be a massive step forward in 
environmental law by requiring an explicit consideration of the risks that 
                                                 
72. Indeed, according to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) and National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS), who are tasked with implementing the ESA, “any action [that] might 
harm a threatened or endangered species” requires application for a “permit [that certifies ESA 
compliance] . . . from the . . . (USFWS) or . . . (NMFS), under Section 10 of the ESA.” See 
Procedures for Endangered Species Act Compliance, URBAN DRAINAGE AND FLOOD CONTROL 
DIST.,  http://www.udfcd.org/recent_news/pdf/Endangered%20Species%20Act%20Procedures% 
20Final%2010252010.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  
73. Environmental Laws & Treaties, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNS., http://www.nrdc.org/ 
reference/laws.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 4332 (2)(c) (2006) (“Congress . . . directs that . . . Federal actions 
[include] . . . a detailed statement . . . on . . . the environmental impact of the proposed action . . . 
[c]opies of such statement . . . shall be made available to the President, the Council on 
Environmental Quality and to the public”). 
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governmental projects and actions pose to the environment, it fails to 
specify any penalty if an environmental impact assessment turns out to 
be inaccurate. Rather, it seeks only to provide the government with 
relevant environmental data. FCA relators, however, may be able to 
provide much needed teeth to NEPA by bringing direct FCA suits 
following the submission to the federal government of any false or 
misleading information submitted as part of an environmental impact 
assessment.  
C. Enforcing Laws that Rely on Permitting as a Means of Environmental 
Management: the Marine Mammals Protection Act  
 Direct FCA claims—FCA claims brought based upon affirmative 
misrepresentations made to the federal government—might also be 
brought to enforce any federal permitting process, a system used to 
manage many federal environmental policies. Consider, for example, the 
Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA). The MMPA “prohibits, with 
certain exceptions, the ‘take’ marine mammals in U.S. waters and by 
U.S. citizens on the high seas, and the importation of marine mammals 
and marine mammal products into the U.S.”76 Authorization for a ‘take’ 
of marine mammals within the meaning of the MMPA comes from 
permits issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Office of 
Protected Resources that may be issued for scientific research, public 
display, and the importation/exportation of marine mammal parts and 
products upon determination by the Service that the issuance is 
consistent with the MMPA’s regulations. 77 
 Although largely deemed a success in the protection of marine 
mammals, there are widespread reports of fraudulent or incomplete 
applications submitted to and approved by the NMFS that have limited 
the Act’s potential to protect threatened marine life.78 Both fraudulent 
and incomplete applications pose a danger to the effectiveness of the 
MMPA, but in somewhat different ways. Outright fraud in the 
application process (e.g., falsely affirming that a take is for an MMPA-
approved purpose) directly contributes to, and indeed sanctions, the 
unnecessary death of marine mammals, many of which are at risk of 
extinction. Incomplete applications, although less pernicious than 
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77. See id.  
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outright fraud, can still threaten to undermine the goals of the MMPA. If 
regulators issue permits based upon incomplete information included in 
these applications, their ability to manage and protect marine mammal 
populations will not be effective as it otherwise could be.  
 This failing in the Act’s implementation and enforcement could be 
effectively addressed by strategic use of the FCA. The FCA permits 
relators to bring direct FCA suits for any false statements included in 
these applications, and enjoins any illegal or unnecessary takings of 
marine mammals that fall within the protections of the Act. Similar suits 
might also be brought to enforce the terms of any other federal law that 
relies on the issuance of permits to individuals seeking to engage in 
environmentally dangerous activities.  
D. Laws that Prohibit Environmentally Dangerous Activities but Require 
No Affirmative Pledge be made to the Federal Government. 
 Even if a federal environmental law does not include a permitting or 
certification process that might be amenable to enforcement through a 
direct FCA suit, nearly any federal law that prohibits environmentally 
dangerous activities might be enforced through application of an implied 
FCA action.  
 Indeed, in one of the few reported cases that considered the 
potential for the FCA to be used as a means to enforce federal 
environmental law, the “Supreme Court . . . determined that regulatory 
approvals are conditions precedent to extracting oil and gas,”79 and 
therefore, oil and gas corporations are subject to implied certification 
FCA claims—claims based upon the theory that when an individual or 
organization accepts federal funds they ‘impliedly certify’ that those 
funds will not be used in contravention of federal law. This holding is a 
strategic boon to potential FCA claimants seeking to enforce federal laws 
protecting coastlines from the ravages that often accompany oil and gas 
drilling operations, such as the Federal Water Control Act, the Act to 
Prevent Pollution from Ships, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, because it obviates the need for a 
potential relator to establish that a polluter has, in addition to polluting, 
also lied about it to the government as would be required in a direct FCA 
claim.  
 The case of U.S. ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Companies, Inc.80 provides 
an example of such a plaintiff. U.S. ex rel. Marcy concerned an oil 
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company employee who alleged that “while employed on [an] offshore 
drilling unit, he was ordered to illegally dump hazardous substances into 
Gulf of Mexico at night [and, in response to these orders,] brought a qui 
tam action on behalf of United States under the False Claims Act.”81 The 
court concluded that: 
[W]hen “the government has conditioned payment of a claim upon 
a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a statute 
of regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when 
he or she falsely certifies compliance with that statute or regula-
tion.” These “false certification of compliance create liability under 
the FCA when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a govern-
ment benefit.” 82 
In this way, the Court’s finding grants standing to any individual who 
merely observes illegal pollution, and allows them to initiate a FCA 
claim to enjoin the behavior.  
VI. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE 
ROLE OF ANIMALS IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 
 The False Claims Act provides immediate pragmatic benefits to 
those seeking to pursue a claim on behalf of the environment or animal 
rights; it allows them to avoid the difficult problem of establishing a 
basis upon which animals can claim the Article III standing necessary to 
proceed in federal court. In addition to that functional benefit, the 
resurrection of the Act’s qui tam provisions in the service of animal 
rights also holds the potential to reframe the debate of the proper role of 
animals in the judicial system as a whole. The present articulation of the 
standing doctrine with respect to animals already ‘gives up the debate’ 
on some fundamental issues with respect to animal rights, as it explicitly 
requires that a litigant seeking to protect animals through the judiciary do 
so only to protect the litigant’s interests, not the interests of the animals 
themselves.  
 Nowhere is this more terrifyingly clear than in the D.C. court’s 
analysis of the standing with respect to animal cruelty, noting that 
animals do not have a judicially recognizable interest in being free from 
inhumane treatment; however, “people have a cognizable interest in 
‘view[ing] animals free from . . . inhumane treatment.’”83This reasoning 
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is alarming because it makes clear the presumption, at least in the area of 
federal standing law, that non-human animals are only valuable 
insomuch as they serve the needs of humans. In this mode of thinking, as 
was made clear by the court’s reasoning, even the suffering of non-
human animals is cognizable to the federal courts only insomuch as that 
suffering is difficult for humans to watch. Such a view gives up the game 
of productively framing the debate over advancing animal rights before it 
even begins. It precludes, for example, an articulation of animal rights 
rooted in an understanding that non-human animals have inherent value 
as sentient beings. As noted by ethicist, philosopher, and animal rights 
advocate Professor Warwick Fox, the Court’s “arguments . . . betray 
anthropocentric assumptions . . . [as it] argue[s] that the nonhuman world 
should be conserved or preserved because of its use value to humans 
(e.g., its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value) rather than for its own 
sake or for its use value to nonhuman beings.”84 Such an 
“anthropocentric value system that only regards natural processes as 
important for human survival cannot serve as the basis of a 
comprehensive environmental policy. . . . [Indeed] anthropocentrism . . . 
has been the primary force in the creation of the environmental crisis”85 
by ensuring the “elimination or overexploitation of those things that are 
not considered of sufficient instrumental value for human beings.”86 Put 
another way, one of the dangers of anthropocentric systems of thought is 
that they provide ideological justification for destroying those parts of 
the environment that do not provide an immediately recognizable benefit 
to humanity. Such a view not only places the lives of non-human animals 
at risk, but also poses a threat to human life as many environmental 
systems are extraordinarily complex and interconnected, such that even 
those aspects of the environment that may appear initially superfluous 
might later prove to serve an important role in the health and survival of 
humanity as well.  
 The FCA’s qui tam enforcement provisions, however, permit an 
alternative and non-anthropocentric vision of ‘standing’ for animals. Qui 
tam relators do not bring suit or seek standing on behalf of themselves or 
to vindicate their own interest. Rather, as courts have explicitly noted, 
“[i]t is clear . . . that in a qui tam action, the government is the real party 
in interest.”87 “When a legislative body enacts provisions enabling qui 
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tam actions, that act carries with it an understanding that in such suits it 
is the government, and not the individual relator, who has suffered the 
injury resulting from the violation.”88 In this way, FCA suits brought on 
behalf of individual animals invite them, at least as a judicial matter, into 
the general body politic as an entity that the government has an 
independent interest in preserving. It is this same interest that the 
government has identified in protecting its own citizens or the unborn.89  
 Recognition by the courts of the state’s interest in animal life is not 
without consequence as it presents a legal and institutional challenge to 
an “attitude [that] is integral to the present ecological crisis,” a 
“hierarchical structure of thinking which presumes that . . . human 
related characteristics are morally more important than the rest of the 
living entities . . . in nature”; that “the natural world is merely a surround, 
backdrop or setting for the main attraction: us.”90 
Some purists might argue that a FCA suit brought on behalf of the 
government to vindicate the interests of animals, as opposed to granting 
animals standing to sue on their own behalf, re-entrenches an 
anthropocentric mindset. However, as noted by legal scholar Cass 
Sunstein, “this type of proceeding is hardly foreign to our law; consider 
suits brought on behalf of children or corporations.” 91 Thus, FCA 
proceedings in which a relator and the federal government assume 
certain “guardian-like” obligations on behalf of individual animals 
should not be considered as exclusive to animals as the same procedure 
has been adopted for human animals and their most revered institutions. 
 In sum, the ‘problem of animal standing’ has plagued those seeking 
to advance the cause of animal rights through the federal judiciary 
because animals, who have suffered injury, are statutorily precluded 
from proceeding in court on their own behalf and their human 
representatives have not been injured in a manner that is sufficient to 
grant them standing. Qui tam suits can function to address this ‘problem 
of animal standing’ by permitting the federal government to serve as the 
injured party for the purposes of establishing Article III standing, and, 
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statutorily, assign the right to redress that injury to individual qui tam 
relators.  
 Permitting the federal government to serve as the injured party 
provides a pragmatic benefit to those seeking to protect animal rights 
through the federal judiciary because it permits suit to proceed beyond 
the filing of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. However, it also 
provides an important ideological benefit. Qui tam suits brought to 
enforce animal rights laws allow the government to assert it has 
sustained harm when laws that protect animal life are violated; this 
mirrors the manner in which the government asserts a right to proceed 
with suits against criminals because they have injured the government by 
violating its criminal laws. Just as the government has an interest in the 
health and safety of human life—achieved through the enforcement of its 
criminal legislation—the government should have an equal interest in the 
health and safety of animal life through the enforcement of its 
environmental and animal rights laws. 
 It is important to recognize that merely bringing qui tam suits to 
vindicate animal rights in federal court will not instantly amount to 
landmark changes. However, the decisions that result from qui tam suits 
brought by animal rights organizations can serve as the ideological basis 
and judicial precedent for broader federal protection of animal rights in 
the future.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 By allowing litigants to avoid the question of standing, the FCA 
provides animal rights advocates a unique and powerful mechanism to 
advance the interests of animals in federal courts. Nevertheless, because 
it was passed as a means to rein in fraud perpetrated against the 
government by defense contractors, the FCA has been largely ignored 
and underused in the context of environmental lawsuits. However, as the 
role of the federal government continues to expand, so does the reach of 
the FCA, and it should be re-engaged in the modern era as a potentially 
revolutionary legal tool. Because federal law is becoming increasingly 
conservative with respect to the protection of animal rights, animals and 
their habitats are in desperate need of lawyers willing to make creative 
use of laws, such as the FCA, that are already on the books. 
 The FCA can be effectively employed by relators to ‘fill the gaps’ 
in currently existing environmental policy. For nearly every criticism that 
might be lodged against the current federal environmental protection 
scheme, the FCA provides a potential solution. Three examples have 
been identified in support of this contention. First, the National 
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Environmental Policy Act, which requires the reporting of potential harm 
to the environment but includes no enforcement or sanction should that 
harm come to pass, can be enforced through the FCA as it permits 
individual relators to seek sanctions in the form of damages and 
injunctions. Second, the Marine Mammals Protection Act, which has 
failed largely due to lack of oversight or mismanagement, can be 
revitalized through the FCA, which ‘deputizes’ every lawyer in the 
United States to enforce its monitoring provisions. Finally, the 
Endangered Species Act, which seeks, without success due lack of 
standing, to provide the authority for individual citizens to enforce its 
provisions, can avoid its standing problem through the FCA, which 
provides a mechanism to side-step the question of standing altogether.  
 Therefore, regardless of its original intent, the civil war era False 
Claims Act can and should be adopted, by environmental lawyers and 
environmental activists, into the canon of landmark environmental 
legislation. 
                                                 
 
